Jesús Padilla Gálvez

The aim of this article is to critically evaluate a review written about the new translation of the Philosophical Investigations. First, it intends to show the dubious procedure and reveal the metaphysical instruments that are used to question and de-legitimize Wittgenstein's grammatical project. Second, it analyzes some of the fallacies employed by the author of the review to discredit the new translation. Finally, it examines a series of metaphysical judgments that are likely to mislead the reader as they relativize the serious mistakes committed in the first translation of the work.

This article deals with a review concerning the new Spanish translation of Wittgenstein’s “Philosophical Investigations”. A detailed analysis of this review reveals that it does not match the original German version. It is mainly criticized because of its substantial mistakes that were made when translating the English version into Spanish. Grammatical structures are confused, the original meaning in German was changed, ‘use’ is confounded with ‘mention’, and semantic fields were fundamentally changed. The author of the review does not take the original sources into account and ignores earlier discussions in the secondary literature. Moreover, the review contains several offending remarks, all of which are considered inappropriate and unusual in the scientific world.

Úvod Zdá se, jakoby největší úspěchy pramenily z omylů. Představím vám je-den z nejpodivnějších omylů, který vedl k novému objevu. Uznávaný autor knihy Vědění a chyby zveřejnil v jiné své knize Analýza vjemů jistou ilustra-ci. Tento obrázek ukazuje Ernsta Macha ležícího na pohovce, jak pozoruje okolí ze své perspektivy. Nejprve popisuje, jak Mach vnímá své zvednuté obočí, svůj nos a svůj knír. Pak pokračuje v popisu jeho bližšího okolí, jako je jeho tělo jako celek, okno ve střední vzdálenosti a to, co vidí skrze toto okno, totiž krajinu se stromy a horizont. Mohli bychom se ptát: Co je na tomto obraze zvláštního? Zvláštní je, že E. Mach tvrdí, že popisuje své " zorné pole " čili způsob vnímání kontur svého okolí. Jedná se však o přesnou reprezentaci toho, co vidí? Zde je obrázek, o němž mluvíme: Vysvětleme si stručně některé teoretické pojmy. To, čemu říká-me euklidovský prostor, je trojdi-menzionální prostor, jehož body jsou jasně viditelné ve všech směrech. Příklad euklidovského prostoru představuje Velásque-E. Mach: Obraz zorného pole

For some time now we have noticed an increasing scepticism regarding the effectiveness of democracy, and its ability to represent citizens through elections. Elections are the central mechanism of political decision taking. However, there is a clear tendency to exploit electo­ rial processes by populist politicians. The ancient ideal of paideia was to educate citizens by following a civic program. Its aim was to enable the citizen to exercise the civil rights and duties. Since the 1970s, however, we had observed two contrasting tendencies: a growth of individualization, and a ecrease of the level of civic education. In the 1990s populist politi­ cal parties entered the political scene of European democracies, some of which have man­ aged to establish a mob rule or ochlocracy (ὀχλοκρατία). Since then, ochlocratic parties have systematically intended to win the votes of politically less educated citizens by offering them a simplified political discourse. In fact, these parties have managed to neutralize the two­party system in many European countries. Thus they managed to block majority­based governments, forcing parties to form coalitions with ideologically opposing smaller parties. This has created a situation in which the " punishment vote " becomes the mean to gain the votes of undecided people who may be characterized as rebels without political culture.

The purpose of this work is to demonstrate that the pragmatic framework for studying Wittgenstein’s proposal is incongruous by sinnlos. It is shown that belief statements are expressions that do not require justification since justification does not belong to the logic of the language game of belief. The work deepens the thesis that for a speaker to be in a position to formulate an opinion about how something can be known has to know the language game that is played. If this game is not dominated then fallacies are generated that derail the language games. In this process will be detailed some games of language that exteriorizes certain forms of life. These forms of life violate fundamental rights. Certain formal and content irregularities are shown.

The aim of this article is, first, to present a critical review of recent publications dealing with the problem of certainty in Wittgenstein's writings. Secondo, possible similarities between Wittgenstein's scarce remarks on the notion of incommensurability and Kuhn's reception are examined. And third, several further articles on related topics are discussed.

“Reflecting on Philosophical Grammar”. The aim of this paper is to analyze Wittgenstein’s philosophical grammar in the Middle Period. The paper examines the thesis that grammar is not responsible for reality. It investigates the role that rules play in this context and how they determine meaning. Special focus shall be put on arbitrary rules. Therefore, we shall develop a thesis of vagueness with special emphasis on perspicuous representation.

The aim of this paper is to analyse what L. Wittgenstein in his
works calls the “bourgeoisie contradiction”. This contradiction may be expressed in the form of a self-referential structure and is a form of paradox of self-consciousness. This paper looks at the thoughts that produced this kind of paradox.

In order to answer this question, we need to clarify what it refers to. We have to find out if “globalization” can semantically be related to ideology. Ideology denotes the entirety of our
personal judgments, ideas and views based on knowledge, experience and sensation by which we perceive and interpret the world, our position in it and the whole society. If we use an enlightened perspective we consider ideology as a kind of prejudice by which reason is dominated. Why is this relevant for the context of globalization? Generally speaking, globalization stands for the process of ongoing international interconnection and progress in nearly all areas of life, such as e.g. in economy, politics, culture and communication. This view involves the implicit experience of change that affects not only our environment, our society and its institutions but also
the national states and their citizens. The environment and its resources are a pre-requisite for globalization. Due to the process of constant market liberalization the resources are changed and ultimately destroyed. In this paper we will discuss as whether political measures have the power of exerting any control upon this dialectic mechanism.

Auf die problematische Konstellation des Rechts zur Freiheit reagieren zwei Antworten in der Politischen Philosophie.  Um überhaupt in Freiheit miteinander leben zu können, so lautet die erste Antwort, ist das Tun Regeln zu unterwerfen. So verweist Fichte darauf, dass „Rechtsgesetze [...] den Umfang der freien Handlungen“ beschränken, und Kant bestimmt das Gesetz als die Bedingung der Möglichkeit von Freiheit. Der Umfang freier Handlungen muss „durch den Begriff der Freiheit des anderen“ beschränkt werden, damit auch da, wo das Gesetz schweigt, Recht und Freiheit mehr oder minder einvernehmlich koexistieren können. Das Recht setzt der Freiheit Grenzen, und die Definition des Rechts ist die konfliktreiche Aufgabe der Politik. Das schließt ein, dass die Bürger nicht erwarten dürfen, dass der Staat für ihr privates Wohl aufkommt, wenn sie nicht rückgängig machen wollen, was sie mit dem Modell des Vertrages und des Tausches für sich selbst errungen haben: nämlich die Selbstregelung ihrer Freiheitsräume, in die staatliche Eingriffe von keiner Legitimation sind, weil die Bürger selbst ihrer Freiheit aus freiem Entschluss Grenzen gesetzt haben.

Aims and Scope

Ludwig Wittgenstein’s writings inspired contemporary philosophical thinking and advanced many issues that had been addressed by traditional philosophy. The questions raised by the Viennese philosopher initiated debates on a reconsideration of philosophical terminology. This is especially true for a term that has generated at least three significant controversies since its creation and will probably generate more disputes in the following years. It is the expression “form(s) of life” which translates into German as “Lebensform(en)” and “Form des Lebens”. The present volume contains contributions on forms of life, language games and the influence of Wittgenstein’s philosophy on other scholears.

Following the bloodshed of 11th March 2004 in Madrid, a number of questions have arisen, questions that, according to our continental understanding of democracy, require prompt answers. A number of these questions have not even been asked yet by the intellectuals of Europe in general and those of Spain in particular. How can a democracy fight terrorism? This is deliberately referred to as the continental-European tradition in contrast to the Anglo-Saxon tradition. The latter has, yet again, embraced Hobbes’s old question and pleads for security at the expense of freedom in all uncertain cases. 11th March in Madrid demonstrated that the terrorist scene has been organising its finances through the trafficking of drugs and arms. Can the systems of democracy with their policies that rest on careful management measures control this black market at all? All these questions are linked closely to the good old question of the limits of freedom. How do we define freedom in a society that must arm itself for the fight against all forms of arbitrary acts of terror, authoritarian rules and various forms of fanaticism?

The points raised by J. A. Fodor about carrying out scientific confirmation have special interest with respect to reasoning in scientific methodology. His investigation proposed that the correction between confirmation and basic interpretation is theoretical; it is about how the structure of scientific thought is exposed by means of our language. It is clear then, that such confirmation has to be established after a careful examination of the data relevant to our thoughts. On the basis of determinate data he develops an interpretation that comes from the Quinean thesis with which the isotropic Quinean platform is specified. Following Fodor, the fixation of scientific thought by undemonstrative means present the aforementioned properties. It is well worth underlining the point such that it emphasizes the modularity hypothesis made on the grounds of semantic proposals.

My analysis of the Wittgenstein’s conception of what is “understanding” starts from Philosophical Investigations § 109, where the activity of “Beschreibung” plays a central role. There Wittgenstein traces a sharp contrast between the activity of “describing” and that of “erklären” and defends the former as the correct philosophical method. So we want to explore that kind of activity as well as the meaning of such a gap. I’ll try to clarify this problem with an extended reference to a similar debate in the field of contemporary philosophy.

The aim of this article is to critically evaluate a review written about the new translation of the Philosophical Investigations. First, it intends to show the dubious procedure and reveal the metaphysical instruments that are used to question and de-legitimize Wittgenstein's grammatical project. Second, it analyzes some of the fallacies employed by the author of the review to discredit the new translation. Finally, it examines a series of metaphysical judgments that are likely to mislead the reader as they relativize the serious mistakes committed in the first translation of the work.

Ludwig Wittgenstein hat sich im Verlauf seiner gesamten Schaffensperiode mit dem Idealismus und dessen extremer Form des Solipsismus auseinandergesetzt. Gegenstand des sogenannten Manuskripts The Big Typescript ist der Idealismus. Darin findet sich das Kapitel Idealismus mit den folgenden sieben Abschnitten: Im ersten Abschnitt geht es um die Darstellung des unmittelbar Wahrgenommenen. Das Thema wird mit der Frage nach der Rolle der Erinnerung im Bereich der Erfahrung eingeleitet. Der Titel des zweiten Abschnitts besteht aus dem folgenden, durch Anführungszeichen gekennzeichneten Zitat: «Die Erfahrung im gegenwärtigen Moment, die eigentliche Realität». Im dritten Abschnitt geht der Autor auf das zentrale Thema des Idealismus ein. Der nächste Abschnitt wird wiederum durch Anführungszeichen bestimmt und ist betitelt mit: «Schmerzen haben.» Der fünfte Abschnitt behandelt die Gedächtniszeit. Im sechsten Abschnitt werden die deiktischen bzw. ostensiven Adverbien in Anführungsstrichen «hier» und «jetzt» untersucht. Schließlich setzt sich Wittgenstein im siebten Abschnitt mit Begriffen wie «Farbe, Erfahrung, etc.» auseinander und behandelt sie als formale Begriffe. In diesem Band werden die relevantesten Thesen dieser Abschnitte behandelt und analysiert.

's writings inspired contemporary philosophical thinking and advanced many issues that had been addressed by traditional philosophy. The questions raised by the Viennese philosopher initiated debates on a reconsideration of philosophical terminology. This is especially true for a term that has generated at least three significant controversies since its creation and will probably generate more disputes in the following years. It is the expression " form(s) of life " which translates into German as " Lebensform(en) " and " Form des Lebens ". The present volume contains contributions on forms of life, language games and the influence of Wittgenstein's philosophy on other scholears.

The book is exceptional because it applies the notion of foms of life to the context of human action. It provides answers to the following questions: Why do we act in a specific way? Why do we make particular decisions? Does one's form of life and language games determine our actions and decisions? Wittgenstein proposes a holistic method which enables us to give coherent answers to these questions. To answer the question of the contents of actions and decisions we have to explain how we have institutionalized these actions or decisions. To this aim we shall reveal the frame within which language games are introduced and have come to function as practice and custom. The scheme of order underlying the language games is illustrated. Human actions and decisions follow particular rules. By highlighting the underlying scheme of order we may gain a perspicuous view of these rules. The aim of this book is to show that actions and decisions generate rational choice. This choice is explained by demonstrating the particular functions of the language games involved.

The book links the concept of intention to human action. It provides answers to questions like: Why do we act intentionally? Which impact do reasons and motives have on our decisions? Certain events are identified as intentional actions when they are considered as being rationalized by reasons. The linguistic description of such events enables us to reveal the structure of intention. The mental and the linguistic constitute irreducible ways of understanding events. Among the topics discussed are intentionality, actions, the linguistic form to talk about intentionality and actions, Brentano's view of intentionality, the phenomenological approach to intention and Wittgenstein's proposals.

The problems associated with understanding come to light in many facets of our lives. This volume is dedicated to describing these facets and clarifying problems related to levels of comprehension, conceptual analysis, understanding oneself and the other as well as cultural aspects of understanding. The authors address the topic in different theoretical frames such as hermeneutics, phenomenology, transcendental, and analytic philosophy.